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H.: Equity--Clean Hands--Iniquity of One Plaintiff Bars All

RECENT CASE COMMENTS
of jurisdiction of the court entering it where his property rights
are injuriously affected. 10 Courts have denied collateral attack by
a subsequent spouse upon grounds of their participation in procuring the divorce, or estoppel generally." The doctrine of laches
has also been applied.-"
It is therefore apparent that the instant case is supported by
authority, as well as by reason and justice. The equitable principles
of clean hands and estoppel, once admitted, apply to bar this suit.
Here the plaintiff participated in procuring the divorce; he has
waited an unreasonable time to complain; and he was principally
responsible for the error of pleading that led to the improper
notice.
It is not contended that subsequent spouses, or third parties
generally, can not, or should not, be allowed to collaterally attack
divorces. The purpose of the writer is to point out that no broad
generalization can be formed, but that "circumstances alter cases",
sometimes forbidding, sometimes demanding the application of the
equitable principles of estoppel.
H. L. W. JR.

EQUITY-CLEAN HANDS-INIQUITY OF ONE PLAINTIFF BARS
ALI,.- A group of persons sued tb enforce a deed of trust given
as security for the unpaid purchase price of shares of stock which
plaintiffs sold defendants. Two of the plaintiffs had been guilty of
such fraudulent conduct in regard to the sale as to be barred from
equity, but others were innocent of any misconduct. Held, that
the innocent plaintiffs could not claim the benefit of a fraud perpetrated by their coplaintiffs. Ford v. Buffalo Eagle Colliery Co.'
The court stated that "the bar of the clean-hands maxim is
not employed for the punishment of wrongdoers; rather, it is introduced to protect the court of equity and the party defendant
from having the powers of the court used in bringing about an
inequitable result in the particular litigation before it."' There
is substantial authority to support such a principle as the basis
0Adams v. Adams, 154 Mass. 290, 28 N. E. 260 (1891) ; Sammons v. Pike,
108 Minn. 291, 120 N. W. 540 (1909) ; 17 Am. JuR. 395; Note (1935) 99 A. L.
R. 13091 1316.
"Van Slyke v. Van Slyke, Margulies v. Margulies, both supra n.3; Notes
(1937) 109 A. L. R.1018, 1026, (1939) 120 A. I.B. 815, 826.
1 Goodloe v. Hawk, 113 F. (2d) 753 (App. D. C. 1940).
1 122 F. (2d) 555 (C.C.A. 4th, 1941).
-

Id. at 563.
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for the clean hands doctrine.' "He who comes into equity must
come with clean hands" is sometimes stated in the form, "He who
hath committed iniquity shall have equity";4 but either form
infers that plaintiff is denied relief because of his own wrong.
Some courts are directly opposed to the proposition as stated in the
instant case, and view the maxim as punitive in nature.'
Walsh states that the clean hands maxim is founded on the
reserved power of equity to deny relief when justice so demands,
even though plaintiff has made out a case in which relief would
normally be granted as a matter of course,' that is, as a factor to
be considered in the exercise of judicial discretion. The courts may
be confusing the clean hands doctrine with the doctrine of hardship in denying a plaintiff relief because of the inequitable result
which would be reached otherwise. The hardship doctrine looks
to the result of the decree, while the clean hands maxim should
look to the merit of the one invoking a court of conscience.' It is
difficult to see how the innocent plaintiffs in the instant case have
been guilty of any conduct which would cause them to have the
"unclean hands" upon which the court bars them from relief.
M'ight it not have been better to say that equity will deny relfef
because of hardship which it would cause defendants? The court
did recognize that hardship is one reason for applying the clean
hands doctrine.8
While it may be more logical to restrict the maxim of clean
bands to plaintiffs barred by their own unconscionable conduct,
and obtain the equitable result of the instant case by applying the
doctrine of hardship, the rule is clear that equitable relief will be
denied one who seeks to reap benefits from a contract obtained
through unconscionable means, even though the particular plain-

3 Smith v. Ajax Pipe Line Co., 87 F. (2d) 567 (C. C. A. 8th, 1937); Kreamer
v. Earl, 91 Cal. 112, 27 Pac. 735, (1891) ; Sherwood Co. v. Sherwood Distilling
Co., 177 Md. 455, 9 A. (2d) 842 (1939) ; see American Ins. Co. v. Lucas, 38 F.
Supp. 896, 921 (W. D. Mo. 1940); d. at 926, 934.
4 PoMEROY, EQUITY JuSPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1918) § 397.
r Clemens v. Clemens, 28 Wis. 637 (1871); see Baird v. Howison, 154 Ala.
359, 366, 45 So. 668 (1908); Busch v. Baker, 79 FIa. 113, 119, 83 So. 704

(2920).

6 WALsr, EQuiTy (1930) § 53.
7See Rubyette Co. v. Vineland Products Co., 48 F. (2d) 288, 291 (D. N. J.
1931).
8 Ford v. Buffalo Eagle Colliery Co., 122 F. (2d) 555, 563 (C. C. A. 4th,

1941).
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tiffs were not involved in the sharp practice. "A court of equity
will not allow itself to become a handmaid of iniquity of any
kind. "9
D. .H.
INJUNCTION

-

INTERFERENCE

RELATIONS-SELLING

WITH

ADVANTAGEOUS

BUsINss

SOLUTIONS IN PUZZLE CONTEST. -Plaintiff

newspaper publisher sought to enjoin defendant, a professional
puzzle solver, from selling his services to contestants in a puzzle
contest which plaintiff had instituted in his paper as a circulation
scheme, offering substantial cash prizes to successful participants.
Defendant's aid to contestants violated a term of the contest which
disqualified all who obtained answers by purchase or exchange.
Held, that defendant's solicitation and sale of answers constituted
an interference with- contracts for which an injunction would issue.
PhiladelphiaRecord Co. v. Leopold.1
It is a truism that one cannot be guilty of inducing a breach
of contract unless a contract exists. Here no contract existed.
There could not be a bilateral contract in which both parties would
be bound,3 for the offeree, being the public, admittedly was under
no duty to perform. Nor was there a unilateral contract for,
until there is the complete performance requested, there can be
no unilateral contract binding the offeror, notwithstanding he may
perhaps be bound to continue his offer after performance is begun,4
nor any breach of such a contract. Hence, defendant was not inducing breach of a contract, as none existed at the time of his interference; rather he was inducing the offeree to render improper
acceptance of an offer. Indeed, the court, after speaking of inducement to .a breach of contract, withdrew from that position,
• Kreamer v. Earl, 91 Cal. 112, 118, 27 Pac. 735 (1891). See Pollock, The
Highwayman's Case (1893) 9 L. Q. REv. 196, and Riddell, A Legal Scandal
Two Hundreds Years Ago (1930) 16 A. B. A. J. 422, discussing Everet v.
Williams (1725), unreported, where relief was denied a highwayman asking an
accounting against his partner in crime.
140 F. Supp. 346 (S.D. N. Y. 1941).
2 Triangle Film Corp. v. Arteraft Pictures, 250 Fed. 981 (C. C. A. 2d, 1918);

Parker v. Brown, 195 S. C. 35, 10 S. E. (2d) 625 (1940); see Walker v.
Cronin, 107 Mass. 555, 563 (1871).
3 1 Wi ,IsTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. 1936) § 13.
4 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 45; see Dyer v. Duffy, 39 W. Va. 148,

1.54, 10 S. E. 540, 543 (1894). The doctrine of mutuality of obligation does
not apply to unilateral contracts. Cf. Railsback v. Raines, 110 Kan. 220, 203
Pac. 687 (1922). But there is a right to have a unilateral contract protected
from malicious interference even though it imposes a duty on the offeror only.
Moran v. Dunphy, 117 Mass. 485, 59 N. E. 125 (1901).
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